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The significance of consistency
The European Community (EC) was initially only competent in the area of trade and
gradually developed a common commercial policy. The 1970s onwards saw increasing
foreign policy co-operation in the framework of European Political Co-operation (EPC). Over
the next two decades the increasing number of external activities of the Union highlighted the
need for consistency between the EC’s external competencies conducted in the context of the
first pillar and the intergovernmental ones of the second pillar and, to an growing extent, the
third pillar. By the late 1990s the European Union (EU) accounted for a greater percentage of
global gross national product than the U.S. and Japan. The EU also contributes more to the
UN budget and peacekeeping operations than either the U.S. or Japan. Given the enormous
importance of the EU as a global actor and its potential to play an even more influential role,
it is not difficult to see why concerns of consistency in the EU’s external activities are
legitimate.
Consistency has become something of a refrain. Most recently the consolidated Treaty
on European Union (CTEU) states that, ‘The Union shall be served by a single institutional
framework which shall ensure the consistency and the continuity of the activities carried out
in order to attain its objectives while respecting and building upon the acquis
communautaire.’ [CTEU, 1997, Article 3] To this end, it is to the Union generally that the
task of ensuring ‘consistency in its external activities as a whole in the context of external
relations, security, economic and development policies’ falls. The Council and Commission
are though charged with particular responsibility in this regard. The objective of achieving
consistency in the Union’s external activities is to ensure that the Union can ‘assert its
identity on the international scheme.’ [CTEU, 1997, Article 2] In support of the general
theme of consistency the European Council identified the aim of the Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP) as being to enable the Union to speak with one voice. The same
theme is returned to within the CFSP mechanisms, both directly but also indirectly through© EIPA
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reference to ‘common positions,’ ‘joint decisions,’ ‘joint actions,’ and, most recently,
‘common strategies.’
As has been indicated, the question of consistency in the Union’s external activities is
not new. It has though assumed special importance in the post-cold war international system
for a number of interrelated reasons:
•   The emergence of the Union in 1993 with its three pillar structure incorporated, for
the first time, foreign and security aspects which had hitherto been part of the
parallel European Political Co-operation (EPC) process, thus bringing to the fore the
need for consistency in the enhanced external activities of the Union;
•   The relatively recent development of the Union calls for the development of
institutional mechanisms to ensure consistency of policy and action at both the
national and European levels which, generally, are in an early stage of development;
•   The end of the cold war has broken down the traditional areas of national ‘high
politics’ and those of ‘low politics.’ In the absence of an overarching threat which
defined a distinct security agenda for the divided Europe for the duration of the cold
war, ‘security’ has increasingly become a term which incorporates many aspects of
the Union’s activity;
•   The overlap between the pillars of the Union has extended since an increasing
number of decisions are adopted that do not fall exclusively within the domains of
any one pillar;
•   The strong encouragement from the Clinton administration since 1991 for its
European allies to develop a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) has
underlined the importance of consistency by EU members within common
organisations such as the UN or NATO;
•   The increasing regionalisation of external activities in other areas of the globe (as in,
for instance, ASEAN and the ARF) calls for consistency on the part of the EU;
•   The number of countries and regions with which the EU Member States maintain
close relations has considerably developed, as has the scope of these relationships.© EIPA
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Consistency v Coherence
The official English language versions of the Single European Act, the Treaty on
European Union (TEU), and the Consolidated Treaty on European Union (CTEU), refer to
the need for ‘consistency.’ The French and German texts however refer respectively to
cohérence and Kohärenz, which carry different legal implications. Christian Tietje, for
example, pointed out that, ‘Consistency in law is the absence of contradictions; coherence on
the other hand refers to positive connections.’ [See Tietje, 1997, pp.212-217; Bacot-Décriaud
and Plantin, 1993, pp.54-58.]  The two terms also imply different degrees of stricture. It is,
for instance, quite conceivable that something is more or less coherent while something
cannot be more or less consistent.
Some have preferred to use the expression ‘coherence’ in English language texts, such
as Jörg Monar, who writes of the importance of ‘unity and coherence’ as an important
criterion for effective foreign policy. [Monar, 1993, p.144] Monar’s preference for
‘coherence’ is common amongst those working from non-English versions of the treaties
referred to. It is only the English version that uses the term ‘consistency’ instead of
‘coherence.’
Unfortunately, the use of differing and potentially confusing terminology was not
rectified during the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference. For the sake of clarity the term
‘consistency’ is preferred since reference will be made to the English language versions of
various official documents. The difference between consistency and coherence has been the
subject of legal scrutiny but, when viewed from a political perspective, the terms are not
significantly at variance since they both point in the direction of co-ordinated activities with
the objective of ensuring that the Union speaks with a ‘single voice.’ For a working definition
of ‘consistency’ as it applies to the EU’s external activities, that suggested by Horst-Günter
Krenzler and Henning C. Schneider could be adopted [Krenzler and Schneider, 1997, p.134]:
Co-ordinated, coherent behaviour based on agreement among the Union and its
member states, where comparable and compatible methods are used in pursuit of a
single objective and result in an uncontradictory (foreign) policy.
Co-ordination would imply the presence of structures that facilitate regular meetings
either within the national foreign policy making apparatus or between them and the EU-level
structures (the idea of institutional bridges). Coherence (perhaps not in the strict legal sense)
should lead to accessible and policy-relevant outcomes to the co-ordination process.© EIPA
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Furthermore, decisions should be made with reference to others adopted in by the Union in its
external activities so that the Union may ‘assert its identity on the international scene;’ note
in this regard that both the TEU and CTEU do not refer to the need for the Member States to
assert their identity. [TEU, 1992, Art.B and CTEU, 1997, Art. 2]  The definition also calls for
comparable and compatible methods in pursuit of a single objective. Taking the last part first,
while the CTEU does define the objectives of the CFSP, it could be questioned whether the
objectives are not too broadly framed (for reasons of consensus) to serve as concise
objectives towards which to work. The idea of comparable and compatible methods raises
problems both at the level of the Union as well as the Member States given the differences
between the first pillar and its supranational structures compared to the intergovernmental
ones of the second pillar.
The meaning of consistency has usefully been sharpened by reference to horizontal
and vertical consistency. [ Krenzler and Schneider, 1997, p.133 and Tietje, 1997, pp.224-33.]
The former refers to the consistency within the EU between the Community’s external
activities and the CFSP. Vertical consistency applies to relations between the Member States
and the Union. Although the concentration is upon horizontal consistency, reference to the
significance of vertical consistency will be made.
While considering terminology, a brief word should be said about what is to be
consistent. The CTEU refers to the importance of consistency of the EU’s ‘external activities
as a whole.’ What though are external activities? The external activities of the European
Union (EU) comprise, according to the CTEU, ‘external relations, security, economic and
development policies.’  Consistency therefore has to be ensured within and between these
components. It is worth noting that the CTEU does not refer specifically to ‘foreign policy’ as
might have been expected. Nor does the treaty refer specifically to ‘defence’ but Article 17 of
the CTEU states that the CFSP shall include ‘the progressive framing of a common defence
policy.’
Reference to external relations and security policy falls largely (but not exclusively)
within the second pillar context while economic and development policies fall within the
competence of first pillar activities. However, the increasing incidence of cross-pillar
activities makes the division between the pillars increasingly artificial. For instance, the
CTEU includes as part of the CFSP’s objectives, to ‘develop and consolidate democracy and
the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.’[CTEU, 1997,
Article 11(1)] Questions regarding competency in this area of the CFSP’s activities has
already led to friction, especially with regard to the Mediterranean, between the first and© EIPA
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second pillars. The potential for future friction has been exacerbated by the Community’s
willingness to impose sanctions, while the definitions of security have become ever more
expansive and emphasise areas that are inherently inter pillar, such as conflict prevention or
crisis management. But, at the same time, the different organisational structures and modus
operandi of the pillars serves to prolong the practical differences between them (and thus
foster inconsistency) based on the differing supranational and intergovernmental approaches
that characterise the first and second pillars respectively.
Consistency as a requirement
Is consistency a legal requirement? This question is of some importance when
attempting to ascertain whether the Member States have a strong legal motive to co-ordinate
their external activities (not, of course, that this is the only one). The EPC process consisted
largely of ‘codification’— that is, putting onto paper what had been agreed to and what had
become accepted practice. To an extent the practice of codification carried over into the TEU
with a number of seeming innovations which, in fact, had been either agreed to before or
were practice (such as the adoption of joint meetings of the EPC Ministerial Meetings and the
Council of the Communities [General Affairs)] or the merger of the EPC and Council
Secretariat). The same process would also apply to other apparently innovative aspects of the
TEU and CTEU, such as the formulation of a common defence policy or joint actions, which
both rely upon a number of implementations (successful or otherwise) in order to codify
practice and rules. Arguably the codification approach does not make for consistency since it
encourages individual Member States, or a group thereof, to push for their own standards or
codes to be adopted.
This aside, the provisions on the CFSP (as laid out in Title V of the CTEU), may
generally be regarded as guidelines or rules but they do not fall into the domain of the
European Communities. Thus, the ‘common’ adage used in reference to, for example, the
Common Agricultural Policy differs from the CFSP in the sense that the former has a
supranational character and is incorporated into municipal law while the latter is not binding
except under public international law and, in some respects, Community law. The idea of
‘common’ in the context of the CFSP differs for two further reasons. First, the means by
which regulations and directives are issued in the Community do not apply to the CFSP since
the regulatory mechanisms differ substantially. For instance, the central role accorded to the
European Parliament and Council in this regard in the first pillar does not apply in the CFSP© EIPA
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context where the Parliament only enjoys the right to be ‘consulted’ by the Presidency and to
be kept ‘regularly informed.’ [CTEU, Art. 21 and CTEC, Art. 249]  Second, the means to
enforce consistency (or admonish inconsistency) are also absent in the second pillar since the
competence of the Court of Justice of the European Communities does not extend to the
CFSP.
 [CTEU, Art. 46]
Although the legal basis for enforcing consistency in the second pillar may be largely
absent there is nevertheless the stipulation in the Consolidated Treaty Establishing the
European Community that:
Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to
ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting from action
taken by the institutions of the Community. They shall facilitate the achievement of
the Community’s tasks. They shall abstain from any measure which could jeopardise
the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty. [CTEC, Art. 10]
The wording of the above article suggests that when the Union (such as a CFSP joint
action in conjunction with Community measures) undertakes an external activity the
obligations above then extend to CFSP. This would lend support to the position that
consistency is a legal obligation under Community law. A second possible manner in which
Community legal competence and that of the Court could extend to the second pillar is
through Article 47 of the CTEU which states that, ‘nothing in this Treaty shall affect the
Treaties establishing the European Communities or the subsequent Treaties and Acts
modifying or supplementing them.’ [CTEU, Art. 47] In spite of these two possible windows
for the legal application of Community consistency to the second pillar, the justiciability
would seem to be weak and indirect. Generally, there are no effective legal means of
enforcing consistency in the second pillar which means that the stipulations contained in Title
V of the CTEU must therefore be considered as legally binding, but unenforceable. Indeed, it
seems ‘inconsistent to identify in very clear terms the responsible parties and the legal
obligation, while neglecting the requisite control by a suitable neutral body.’ [Krenzler and
Schneider, 1997, p.147]
The background to consistency
The treaty establishing the European Economic Community, although lacking an
explicit foreign and security policy aspect, nevertheless made the Community an external© EIPA
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actor of some consequence. Although consistency was not mentioned per se the foundations
for consistency were nevertheless present. Under the Treaty of Rome all Member States were
obliged in Article 5 to ‘abstain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of
the objectives of this treaty.’ With the development of European political co-operation (EPC)
in the 1970s the need for consistency in external relations became more apparent.
The Paris Summit of 1972 called for co-operation to ‘deal with problems of current
interest and, where possible, to formulate common medium-and long-term positions, keeping
in mind, inter alia, the international political implications for and effects of Community
policies under construction.’ [Nuttall, 1992, p.74] The early years of EPC were though
typified by deliberate efforts to keep the Community and EPC processes parallel, but distinct.
The fear was that somehow the EPC could not be permitted to carry out parallel functions and
assume commensurate responsibilities as the Community and, with special regard to the
Commission, the same applied to Community-EPC relations. EPC therefore remained
something of a diplomatic preserve for the period 1970-1986. The somewhat artificial
divisions between the Community and EPC eroded during the 1980s culminating in The
Single European Act (SEA) that not only linked the processes but also laid particular
emphasis on enhancing consistency.
Prior to the SEA consistency had meant not only the obvious -- ensuring that the EPC
and the Community did not cancel or contradict each other’s actions -- but it also implied that
there should be a distinction between EPC and the activities of the Community so that they
did not contaminate one another. Given the rather limited purview of the EPC process it is
perhaps unsurprising that there are few, if any, examples of blatant inconsistency. Under the
SEA the increasing interaction between EPC and the Community that had been evident from
the early 1980s was recognised. For instance, Article 30.5 of the SEA states that the ‘external
policies of the European Community and the policies agreed in European Political Co-
operation must be consistent.’
1 The preamble to the same treaty stresses the need for Europe
to speak ‘ever increasingly with one voice and to act with consistency and solidarity in order
more effectively to protect its common interests.’  In the SEA horizontal consistency was
addressed by the Commission being granted the right to give its opinion to the Presidency
and, in turn, the Presidency was obliged to communicate to the Council any EPC conclusions
of interest to the Community. It is worth brief note that Britain and West Germany were in
favour of placing responsibility for consistency on the shoulders of the Member States
                                                
1 The co-operation was limited to political and economic aspects of security policy.© EIPA
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themselves. This was though thought to be inadequate and the tasks were duly charged to the
Presidency and Commission, assisted by the new EPC Secretariat, consisting of five officials,
acting under the authority of the Presidency. The Secretariat was charged with the task of
assisting the Presidency in ‘ensuring the continuity of European political cooperation and its
consistency with Community positions.’ [Ministerial Decision, (1986), Section III]
The ‘consistency’ refrain has continued from 1987, when the SEA came into force.
Successive Presidency’s were well aware that henceforth consistency was one of the criteria
on which they would be judged. For instance, Sir Geoffrey Howe as the outgoing President-
in-Office of the Council and the Foreign Ministers observed that, ‘our Presidency has had
considerable success in ensuring consistency between EPC and Community activity in the
spirit of the Single European Act.’ [Howe, 1986, Doc. 86/402] The Rhodes summit of the
European Council stressed common positions and joint actions were a key means of reaching
consistency between the external policies of the EC and the policies agreed to within the EPC
framework. [European Council, Rhodes, 1988] The Heads of State and Government declared
at their Dublin meeting of April 1990 that, in view of political union, they should reinforce
their capacity to respond ‘efficiently and effectively’ to external challenges; to display ‘unity
and consistency’ in international actions; and to strengthen democratic legitimacy.
The nature of consistency shifted subtly at the beginning of the 1990s with less
emphasis upon consistency amongst the Member States and greater emphasis being paid to
consistency in the external policies of the Community. This was due, as Fraser Cameron has
noted, to the emphasis turning ‘more to financial and economic diplomacy.’ He also noted
that technical and humanitarian assistance also grew in importance. [Cameron, 1997b, p.99]
The growing role of the Commission in co-ordinating assistance programmes to Poland and
Hungary (PHARE, which was later extended to all of central eastern Europe), the
Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) and its empowerment to negotiate Europe
Agreements with these same countries, all pointed to a far more active European role in
external relations aided and abetted by the immediate post-cold war changes. As a mark of
the growing European role in external relations a new Directorate-General with responsibility
for external affairs was created in 1993.
The transition from EPC to CFSP saw the Belgian Presidency stress a number of
factors deemed essential for the successful implementation of CFSP, one of which was the
need for ‘unity and consistency in [the Union’s] external action.’ [European Council,
Luxembourg, 1993] Attempts to bring unity and coherence to the Union’s external activities
has traditionally been viewed as a task falling to the Union with less regard being paid to the© EIPA
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Foreign, or other, Ministries of the various Member States. In a sense this is understandable
since the Treaty on European Union (TEU) required the Union ‘to organize, in a manner
demonstrating consistency and solidarity, relations between the member states and between
their peoples.’ Article C of the same treaty requires that, ‘The Union shall in particular
ensure the consistency of its external activities as a whole in the context of its external
relations, security, economic and development policies’ (emphasis added). The Member
States are however also obliged to ‘support the Union’s external and security policy actively
and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity,’ and to ‘work together to
enhance and develop their mutual political solidarity.’ In order to do this Member States shall
‘refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its
effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations’ – thus applying Article 5 of the
Treaty Establishing the European Union specifically to the Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP).  Ensuring consistency in the EU’s external activities is therefore a shared
responsibility between the Union and the Member States themselves. The notion that the
burden of consistency falls partly upon the shoulders of the Member States is further
reinforced by the assumption of the leading role by the Council which marks a change in
emphasis from the SEA. [See Article J.8(1), TEU]
In spite though of the binding nature of the obligations assumed under the CFSP upon
the Member States, the national identities and the ‘specific character of the security and
defence policy of certain Member States’ are safeguarded in several ways by the TEU. [As in
Arts. J.3 (6) and J.4 (4)] Although provision is made for the use of qualified majority voting
in the second pillar, the practice remained unanimity that safeguards the essential interests of
the member states. The European Council also protects national interests in the case of joint
actions (since a joint action can only be based on general guidelines supplied by the European
Council). Inevitably the balance between the protection of national interests and need to
ensure consistency in the external activities of the Union will, on occasion, be delicate.
In a Liaison Committee position statement prior to the 1996 IGC, the need for
consistency was underlined when they stated that ‘There is a need to ensure that other Union
policies and practices do not contradict or undermine but support the objectives of
Development Cooperation.’ [Liaison Committee, (1995), Introduction]  Trade, Agriculture
(CAP) and CFSP were noted as areas with particular problems in this regard. The statement
made the observation that, ‘despite the commitments at the level of principle’ there remains a
conspicuous absence of a clear policy on coherence and as a result there are no mechanisms
that exist to increase the chances of coherence in policy development, implementation,© EIPA
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monitoring and evaluation. This is a key weakness.’ [Liaison Committee, (1995), Section
2.1.2]
As a result of the concern regarding consistency expressed before and during the 1996
IGC, no less than three explicit references to consistency appeared in the CTEU.
2 The CTEU,
which incorporates the Treaty of Amsterdam, accords to the European Council the task of
defining the principles and general guidelines for the CFSP and to decide on common
strategies ‘where the Member States have important interests in common.’ [Article 13(1&2)
(CTEU)] The implicit recognition is therefore that there are some areas that are likely to be of
greater interest than others to individual Member States and that the aim of the CFSP is not a
unitary ‘European’ foreign policy (at least for the foreseeable future) but the close co-
ordination of national action by the fifteen Member States. This does not however preclude
there being ‘European’ positions on a variety of foreign policy issues such as elections in
Russia, South Africa, the Middle East Peace process, or Bosnia. It would though be grossly
premature to write of a truly common foreign and security policy, especially as the security
and defence aspects remain largely undefined and subject to the political will of the Member
States.
From the perspective of the national Foreign Ministries the task of defining ‘foreign
policy’ vis-à-vis the Union has been made slightly simpler by the TEU which placed Justice
and Home Affairs (JHA) under a separate ‘pillar.’ Prior to this justice and home affairs
appeared under the EPC structures and thus somewhat surprisingly fell under the
responsibilities of the Foreign Ministries, in spite of the fact that relations with third parties
featured infrequently. Although the division of the CFSP and JHA in the TEU (Titles V and
VI respectively) clarified matters somewhat there are still significant grey areas such as
asylum policy, human rights, and terrorism that could legitimately involve both pillars.
The evolution of the principle of consistency and the shared responsibility for it
between the Union and the Member States suggests, as was noted above, two forms of
consistency. First, consistency within the Union and within the external affairs apparatus of
the individual Member States (horizontal) and, second,  between the Member States and the
Union and vice versa (vertical) (see. Figure --).
                                                
2 Article 1 talks of the need to demonstrate ‘consistency and solidarity’ in the relations between the Member
States; Article 3 mentions ‘consistency and continuity;’ while Article 13 charges the Council with the task of
ensuring the ‘unity, consistency, and effectiveness of action’ by the Union.© EIPA
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Commission vertical      consistency  Community 
& Council  Structures
Foreign  vertical    consistency Domestic
Ministry or Ministries
Central Agency
Horizontal  consistency
Member States
Broadly speaking the challenges arising from horizontal and vertical consistency
differ. At the Community level horizontal consistency involves primarily the implementation
of external policies by the supranational organisation; in this case the European Commission.
Implementation is backed up in most cases, with the important exception of the CFSP, by
resort to the European Court of Justice. Horizontal consistency also involves the process by
which the individual government department defends its interests within the national
bureaucracies. In some highly centralised systems, such as those in France or the United
Kingdom, there are mechanisms to ensure that a consistent national position is represented in
Brussels. However, some highly decentralised systems, such as those in Germany and
Greece, are less effective at the implementation of a national ‘line’ in Brussels.
Vertical consistency involves the processes of coordination and bargaining between
the member states and the EU and vice versa. Vertical consistency, in particular, involves the
co-ordination and satisfaction of a large number of interested parties ranging from private
interest groups, lobbyists (home and Brussels based), the government ministries themselves
and, for support in the Council, other member governments.
The emergence of a consistent position on any given foreign policy topic is therefore
a long-drawn out and complicated process (See Fig. --)© EIPA
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Figure ----
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Examples of both types of consistency are to be found in the various EC treaties. For
instance, the Maastricht Treaty refers in Article C to the Union’s duty to ‘ensure the
consistency of its external activities as a whole in the context of its external relations,
security, economic and development policies.’ This is a clear reference to horizontal
coherence within the Union. Vertical consistency is also referred to. For instance, in Article
130u of the same treaty (with specific reference to development cooperation) refers to the
need for Community policy ‘which shall be complementary to the policies pursued by the
Member States.’
The emphasis accorded to consistency has also gradually increased as the EC assumed
responsibility for an increased variety of external responsibilities. In the post-cold war
context the increasingly expansive definitions of post-cold war security,
3 combined with the
Union’s vague use of the term ‘external activities,’ means that the range of activities being
subject to consistency has expanded enormously and underlined the importance of the
concept.
The division of consistency into its horizontal and vertical variants is a helpful
distinction from the conceptual point of view but, at the policy level, the problems
encountered in both types of consistency are related.  Simon J. Nuttall as Director, DG I
“External relations” Commission of the EC, observed on this theme:
                                                
3 For an example of how expansive post-cold war definitions of security have become see William Burros (ed.),
Conference Report -- Global Security Beyond 2000: Global Population Growth, Environmental Degredation,© EIPA
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The problem [of consistency] cannot be solved only, or even principally, within the
Union itself. It stems from the separate responsibilities of the different national
Ministries, each of which will use the framework of the Union as a means of escaping
from the supervision of its fellow Ministries at home. Rivalries between the political
and economic sections of the Foreign Ministries and between the Foreign Ministries
and other Ministries will come to the fore. The way in which the Member States
organize themselves at home is a problem which must be tackled in parallel with the
organization of the Union. [Nuttall (1993), p.138]
Nuttall’s observation raises the problem of what is ‘foreign policy’ to the Member
States and what might it constitute in the context of ‘European foreign policy?’ Obviously the
scope of national foreign policy is not the same as that covered by the second pillar of the
EU. Many aspects of national foreign policy have been deemed to fall outside the
competence of the Union, such as security in Northern Ireland, or the refugee status in the
Community for Cypriots who fled from Northern Cyprus. [Neuwahl, (1994), pp.230-1] The
overlap between the two has been subject to compromise and remains somewhat elastic. The
intergovernmental nature of the second pillar which, to a large extent, still relies upon
unanimity will help to ensure that individual Member States not only retain tight control over
what may be subject to the EU’s external activities but also uphold their sovereignty.
Consistency is thus likely to be found in those activities that are well-supported amongst all
Member States (human rights), where the object of the decision or action is relatively distant
(the Great Lakes region of Africa), or where consensus has emerged between the EU Member
States in another venue (the UN or OSCE).  The obvious suggestion therefore is that those
issues that are closer to home (Bosnia or Kosovo), or those that are likely to have a direct
impact upon Member States (again Bosnia), or where asymmetrical economic relations are
involved (the Persian Gulf), are less likely to prove conducive to consistent behaviour. The
nearer the threat to home, the more likely consistency is to be sacrificed to national
considerations as was seen to tragic effect in Bosnia and, to a lesser extent, in Albania.
In order to understand the problems of attaining consistency, a closer examination of
the different types of consistency will be undertaken, commencing with horizontal
consistency.
                                                                                                                                                       
Migration, and Transnational Organized Crime, (Pittsburgh: University Center for International Studies,
University of Pittsburgh, 1996).© EIPA
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Horizontal Consistency
Horizontal consistency consists of two sets of issues that are, in turn, linked vertically
by communication, structures and procedures. The first set of issues pertains to how the EU
member states themselves co-ordinate external relations with the EU. The second set,
examined afterwards, considers how external relations are co-ordinated within the Brussels
bureaucracies so that the Union may speak with a single voice.
Co-ordination within the Member States
Who should co-ordinate external relations in the member states? The question is not
as simple (or banal) as it may seem. Obviously the foreign ministries, may be the response.
But, there are numerous ministries who may additionally have legitimate external relations
interests such as ministries of economics or trade, development, agriculture, defence, justice
and so forth. In fact, given the sweeping nature of the Community’s acquis, it is difficult to
think of a ministry who would not have a compelling interest. Generally, the co-ordination
process amongst the ministries, as well as other interested parties such as interest groups, is
designed to defend the national interest and to ensure that what is implemented in Brussels is
as close to this as possible.
The broad scope of the EC’s external competencies is fast being matched by that of
the EU and member states may be legitimately challenged in the European Court of Justice
for failure to implement policy. This means that most member states have a vested interest in
promoting the role of foreign ministries as the traditional defender of their external relations.
The knock-on effect of this is that foreign ministries now have to deal with not only
traditional diplomacy, or high politics, but a broad range of external policies related to the
domestic ministries. If this is put in rather combative terms, co-operation amongst the
domestic ministries and the role of the foreign ministries as protectors of the national interest,
has been promoted by the growing supranationalisation of the EU member states’ external
policies.
David Spence observed, there are three integral parts of the machinery of national
policymaking in EU common to all EU governments: the ‘lead’ ministries, foreign ministries
with a monitoring and co-ordination role and the Permanent Representatives.[Spence, 1999,
p.249-50]  Generally, as Spence observes, foreign ministries no longer enjoy the sole right to
act as ‘gatekeeper.’ This role is either assumed by formal structures, such as the European© EIPA
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Secretariat of the British Cabinet Office or the French Secrétariat Général pour la
Coordination Interministerielle des Affaires Economiques Européennes (SGCI).
Alternatively, as is the case in Germany, the role may be assumed by the office of the head of
government.
Beneath the formal structures, if they exist, there will be a ‘lead ministry.’ Exactly
which ministry this may be is issue dependent but, whichever it is, there will be routine
contact between the lead ministry and other domestic ministries as well as the foreign affairs
ministry. Within each ministry there will be close links between the Commission’s
directorate-generals and the European co-ordinating divisions within a given ministry. The
prime role of the co-ordinating divisions is not so much to manage detail but to ensure that
European policy conforms with the broad thrust of national policy. The domestic ministries
and their co-ordination divisions will work in close contact with the foreign ministries to
ensure that national positions into various European bodies, such as the Council of Ministers,
is coherent and that it represents an accurate portrayal of the interests of all ministries
involved.
The question of whether the lead ministry or the foreign ministry prevails in case of
dispute normally results in the latter asserting its skill and influence. As Spence observes,
foreign ministries have the required special knowledge of the EU system and the skills to put
a national point forth within that system. It is the foreign ministry’s role as primus inter pares
that means that the ‘proprietorial feelings of a particular ministry may have to be bruised.’
Spence adds, ‘That foreign ministries possess such capabilities and that they are clearly the
most appropriate coordinators of daily business is generally accepted.’ [Spence, 1999, p.251]
The national ‘mouthpiece’ to Brussels is therefore the foreign ministry and they
normally monitor developments in Brussels and communicate with it through one of two
divisions within the foreign ministry. Normally, one will address domestic aspects of the
EU’s activities (the internal market, environment, energy and agriculture) while the other will
address the external aspects (trade, assistance, development and the CFSP). The dual
structure within the foreign ministries reflects that of the EU itself with COREPER I,
addressing domestic affairs, and COREPER II addressing external issues.
The role of the foreign ministry as the central co-ordinator is not merely a matter of
interministry pecking-order but an essential part of consistency itself. The foreign ministry is
the key facilitator of co-ordination mechanisms between the ministries and they carry the
main responsibility for preparing and presenting national positions not only on a day-to-day
basis but also Council meetings and intergovernmental conferences. Lead ministries play an© EIPA
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active role in interpreting, understanding and making technical suggestions in their respective
fields of competence, but they must also be prepared to incorporate the foreign ministry as an
equal negotiating partner in their ministerial deliberations.
The effectiveness of the co-ordinating mechanisms within a given EU member state
will depend very much upon how well established lines of communication and information
are as well as upon the presence, or not, of centralised dispute solving mechanisms. Crucially,
it also depends upon the willingness of the domestic ministries to trust the foreign ministries
to assert the national interest and not that of the foreign ministry itself. Trust of this nature
may be less prevalent in, for instance, a coalition government with party political inter-
ministerial rivalries. The presence of clear lines of communication will also vary from one to
another EU member state and this will influence the ability of the member state to define and
defend its national position. As a general issue, consistency will also depend upon the
continued ability of the foreign ministries to cope with the considerable demands that are
being made upon them. Although speculative, the dramatic changes in foreign ministries
from dealing with glamorous high politics to a more mundane, but nonetheless important, co-
ordination role may have negative effects upon recruitment.
The foreign ministry’s role is traditionally seen as being strengthened through the
Permanent Representations in Brussels. This image is reinforced by the fact that the
Permanent Representative was normally a senior diplomat with diplomatic status. However,
with increasing frequency the Permanent Representations are staffed by secondees from the
domestic ministries. The often highly technical nature of the job makes such staffing a
necessity and this has resulted in a gradual shift of the balance from foreign ministry staffing
to lead ministry staffing which is ‘arguably a trend underlining the foreign ministry’s failure
in the historic endeavour to retain a gatekeeper role.’ [Spence, 1999, p.253] The Permanent
Representatives have themselves developed a gatekeeper role through their close connections
with their counterparts in the Commission. In national interest terms, the Permanent
Representatives are the initial line of defence since they will conduct much of the initial pre-
negotiation, outlining and defence of national positions and thus shaping of the
Commission’s proposals. Since, as observed, they have diplomatic status but are not
necessarily career diplomats, they once again serve to redefine the notion of ‘diplomat’ in the
EU context.
The issue of who co-ordinates external policy and, just as important, who is
responsible for dispute settlement, are aspects upon which there is little harmony within the
EU. On the one hand the highly centralised role of the British and French systems demote the© EIPA
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role of the foreign ministries by placing the prime minister’s offices with this important
function. Many other countries, such as Belgium and Germany, will leave the arbitration
process up to the foreign and ‘lead’ ministry (often the economics ministry). This can, as is
frequently the case in Greece, lead to inter-ministerial disputes in which the national interest
risks being sacrificed to that of the individual ministers concerned.
The effectiveness of foreign ministries and their gate-keeping role may also be
compromised by those aspects of external relations that are not covered within the structures
outlined. For instance, as Spence observes, foreign ministries ‘do not manage the bi-lateral
relations with European countries whether EU members of non-members.’[Spence, 1999,
p.252]  It is quite possible therefore for ministries to establish their own connections with
their counterparts in other countries with little regard being paid to the foreign ministry’s
gatekeeping role.
The transferral of competency from member states to the EU raises issues about
democratic accountability which again burdens the foreign ministries with the task of
scrutinising the consistency of EU policy with national positions. It has also changed the
focus of lobby or pressure groups from the domestic to the supranational level. The role of
lobby groups poses a problem for the member states since a lobby group may deliberately by-
pass the domestic political apparatus in favour of direct lobbying at the European level when
they believe their government does not hold their position or will not defend their interests
and that the Commission will. The role of the Foreign Ministry is therefore doubly
complicated since not only must they defend national positions, as agreed upon by the
domestic ministries, but they must court domestic pressure groups and lobbyists.
The complex relations between a given domestic ministry and the foreign ministry are
simplified by the fact that the former has an interest in defending their national position and
promoting the role of the foreign ministry as the defender of the collective interest. They are
complicated by the increasingly complex web of lobbying groups who may choose to lobby
directly at the European level when they feel that their platform is not represented at the
national level. The role of the foreign ministry, in defending national interests, may also be
complicated by differences between the home ministries and the Committee of Permanent
Representatives. The demands made upon Foreign Ministries throughout the EU are
considerable. No longer is the focus exclusively upon traditional diplomacy but upon an
increasingly complicated co-ordination and gate-keeping function.© EIPA
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Consistency at the EU level
Formally Article 30 (5) of the Single European Act (SEA) made the Presidency of the
EPC and the Commission responsible for consistency. With the advent of Union including
the CFSP as an integral component, the onus of responsibility shifted to the Council and the
Commission. In the context of the SEA though consistency was confined to ‘policies agreed’
within the co-operation framework whereas in the TEU, and thereafter, reference is made to
the ‘policy of the Union.’
4
The TEU accords to the Union the general responsibility for ensuring consistency of
its external activities as a whole but, in the same paragraph, charges the Council and the
Commission with ensuring the implementation of these policies, ‘each in accordance with its
respective powers.’[TEU, Article C] A Declaration attached to the TEU gave some substance
to the apparatus for ensuring consistency when it identified three areas in which ad hoc co-
operation could lead to enhanced consistency: first, co-operation between the Political
Committee and the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER); second, the
merging of the Political Co-operation Secretariat with the General Secretariat and; lastly, co-
operation between the latter and the Commission.
5
The CTEU also charges the Council and the Commission with responsibility for
ensuring consistency for the Union’s external activities as a whole and for them to ‘cooperate
to this end.’[CTEU, 1997, Article 3] Their responsibilities in this regard are underlined by the
general stipulation that the Union is to be served by a ‘single institutional framework.’ The
role of the Commission changed considerably between the TEU and the CTEU, with
associated implications for consistency. Under the CTEU’s stipulations of the CFSP, the
Commission is accorded the significant right of initiative to the Commission as well as the
Member States. [CTEU, 1997, Article 22] The Commission has become an external relations
player in its own right not only through the right of initiative but through its executive powers
pertaining to the EC’s external policies. The Member States therefore not only have to co-
ordinate their initiatives and responses within their own bureaucracies, as well as between
themselves, but they also have to deal with the Commission as in many respects a co-equal.
The Commission itself had earlier difficulties in co-ordinating its increasingly
demanding external relations portfolio. As was noted earlier, the decision in 1993 to create a
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new Directorate-General (DG 1A) with responsibility for political affairs, presented a number
of problems. Eventually the conduct of the Commission’s external delegations was placed
under a joint committee representing DG 1A, DG 1 and DG VIII, with DG 1A in the chair
and also responsibility for making proposals. A modus vivendi emerged soon thereafter with a
series of regular meetings between the cabinets and senior staff from DG1 and DG 1A. In
effect the former, under Sir Leon Brittan addressed trade issues while the latter, under Hans
van den Broek, addressed external political affairs. There were, according to Fraser Cameron,
‘few problems with coordination of policies’ by the summer of 1994. (Cameron, 1997b,
p.101)
The Delors Commission’s initiatives served to not only put the Commission on the
map as a potent political force in external relations but also created a perhaps unfortunate
division between external economic and political affairs. This was generally an unhelpful
division in terms of consistency since many problems contained elements that could
legitimately be deemed economic and political. The Santer Commission therefore strove to
reunify the economic and political elements by dividing responsibility in external relations
into geographical areas. Under Santer’s new design responsibility for external relations would
now be divided between five semi-autonomous Director-Generals. These included D-Gs 1,
1A but also included 1B, VIII and the EC Humanitarian Aid Office. DG 1 now covered
commercial policy and relations with North America, the Far East, Australia and New
Zealand, under Sir Leon Brittan. DG 1A covered relations with Europe and the Newly
Independent States, CFSP and External Missions under Hans van den Broek while DG 1B,
under, Manuel Marin, assumed responsibility for Southern Mediterranean, Middle and Near
East, Latin American, South and South-East Asia and North-South Cooperation. DG VIII,
under João de Deus Pinheiro assumed responsibility for development which includes
relations with the 69 ACP countries including Lomé. Lastly, Emma Bonino was appointed as
head of the European Community Humanitarian Office. During Santer’s term in office the
number of Commission delegations grew to 127 which served as additional reminder of not
only the Commission’s growing influence but the extent to which the EU has become a bona
fide global actor in its own right. [Figure in Spence, 1999, p.247]
The addition to the Council Secretariat of Directorate-General E, headed by Sir Brian
Crowe, also represented an additional requirement for co-ordination. Within DG E Leonidas
Evangelidis assumed responsibility for CFSP while Cornelis Stekelenburg became Director-
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General for External Relations. The DG is responsible for the preparation of Council
meetings, support for the Presidency, and briefing of dialogue partners. The CFSP unit within
the Council Secretariat therefore has a rather technical role and is also very small with only
twenty of so staff. The chances of serious duplication occurring between the Commission and
the Council are therefore rather limited. In order to monitor each other’s work representatives
from the relevant external relations DG’s within the Commission and Council meet on a
regular basis and the former has even seconded a staff member to the secretariat. In addition,
the Commission has taken its responsibility to keep the European Parliament informed very
seriously and van den Broek has been a ‘regular attender at sessions of the Committee
dealing with external political relations.’ [Cameron, 1997b, p.102]
In both the TEU and CTEU contexts the consistency stipulations have proven
enormously difficult to implement since open differences still exist between first and second
pillar competencies in the field of external activities. An exchange of notes between the
Commission and the Council regarding common positions on Rwanda and the Ukraine in
1994 resulted in a turf battle and charges of mutual encroachment. Recognising the need for
some mechanism to address these tensions the CTEU provided for a safeguard whereby the
‘Council may request the Commission to submit to it any appropriate proposals relating to the
common foreign and security policy to ensure the implementation of a joint action.’[CTEU,
Art. 14 (4)] Ultimately, the degree to which consistency is ensured will depend upon the
willingness of the Commission and Council to reach arrangements and solutions between
themselves since the stipulations of TEU and CTEU pertaining to the second pillar are legally
non-binding.
The successive treaties have established a dual structure for decision-making in the
EU’s external affairs. Difficulties have arisen due to the differing competencies between the
EU and it responsibility for external affairs and the CFSP, especially when many
undertakings (such as election monitoring) increasingly fall into a grey area between the two.
The dual structure of the EU’s external policy is summarised in Appendix I.
Progress has been made on horizontal consistency with the undoing of the remaining
vestiges of the parallel EPC and Community structure. For instance, Working Parties would
report to the Political Committee if working in the EPC structure or to the Permanent
Representatives in the Community structure. With the advent of the TEU all Working Parties
became Council Working Parties. Similarly, the merging of the EPC Secretariat with the
Council’s General-Secretariat has enhanced consistency. However, in spite of these advances
and the move towards a ‘single institutional framework’ the decision-making procedures and© EIPA
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structures still mark the CFSP as an intergovernmental process and the Community’s external
activities as communautaire.
Although ‘joint actions’ are referred to below as part of vertical consistency, they also
have horizontal aspects. Joint actions can be considered as applying between the Union and
the Member States (hence vertical) but the relationship between a joint action (CFSP) and
Community measures (EC) poses questions pertaining to horizontal consistency. Since, as
has been observed, the first and second pillars differ substantially in the way they operate and
in character, the task of ensuring consistency in external activities of the Union becomes a
delicate matter. Theoretically the CFSP and EC external activities should be complementary
and not hierarchical. However, in the event of expansive definitions of ‘joint actions’ being
used, the issue then becomes one of the CFSP extending its remit in external activities to the
Community and thus diluting the communautaire nature of the first pillar’s external activities.
A further contentious area of concern for horizontal consistency is finance. The net
effect of the budgetary arrangements, as established in the TEU, was to give the Member
States an incentive to charge as much as possible to the Community budget under the ill-
defined ‘administrative expenditure’ category. [TEU, Art. J11 (2)] The incentive sprang not
only from the obvious incentive to avoid placing further strain on national budgets, but also
to avoid EP purview as it applies in the EC budget. The strains between the Council and the
EP were partially resolved in Article 28 of the CTEU by which the Member States are able to
charge most administrative and operational expenditure to the Community budget.
6 The
CTEU provided an answer to EP charges of padding by Member States of the ‘administrative
expenditure’ category, by providing for some operational expenditure to be charged to the
Community budget, while the EP was accorded greater oversight over the CFSP by means of
budgetary procedures. The EP’s competence is though circumscribed to laying down the
annual CFSP budget in certain pre-defined areas and does not extend to a veto right over the
budget of every joint action. The inter-institutional agreement may not necessarily enhance
consistency since in those cases where the administrative expenditure is not charged to the
EC’s budget, it shall be charged to the member states according to a GNP scale unless the
Council, acting unanimously, decides otherwise. Given the pressure for a reallocation of
overall budgetary contributions, spearheaded by Germany, it is difficult to imagine a sliding
GNP scale as a satisfactory arrangement (this is compounded in Germany’s case with a
continuing reticence towards involvement in combat operations).© EIPA
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The ability to conduct long-term planning is a critical aspect of consistency. A
number of supporting declarations were adopted by the IGC in June 1997 designed to
enhance the efficiency of the CFSP. The WEU, which bears responsibility for the defence
implications of the CFSP, presented a declaration on its role and relations with the EU and
NATO. The declaration included the establishment of a Policy Planning and early Warning
Unit (PPEWU) in the General-Secretariat of the Council under the responsibility of the
Secretary-General.[WEU Declaration, 1997, Section 6] The unit is to be composed of
personnel drawn from the General Secretariat, the Member States, the Commission and the
WEU. The responsibilities of the new unit shall include:
•   Monitoring and analysing developments in areas relevant to the CFSP;
•   Providing assessment of the Union’s foreign and security policy interests and
identifying areas where the CFSP should focus in future;
•   Providing timely assessments and early warning of events or situations which may
have significant repercussions for the Union’s CFSP, including potential political
crises;
•   Producing, at the request of either the Council or the Presidency or on its own
initiative, argued policy papers to be presented under the responsibility of the
Presidency as a contribution to policy formulation in the Council, and which may
contain analyses, recommendations and strategies for the CFSP.
The precise composition of the unit remains unclear following the rejection of
proposals forwarded by Jürgen Trumpf. According to one report, ‘Paris wanted the unit to go
considerably further than Trumpf’s paper indicated, while other countries claimed it went too
far.’[Turner, (1998), p.6] Amongst the issues to be decided is its composition, its rules of
operation, its relations with the Council Secretariat and to whom it reports. The procedure for
the adoption of answers to these issues is also unclear – should majority or consensus take
them? Aside from the fact that the unit is of uncertain composition, it will be of little utility
for the future unless indigenous capabilities for early warning are developed in the EU/WEU
context. Most EU members consider that the PPEWU should be a separate unit within the
Directorate-General of the Council Secretariat responsible for external relations. On the other
hand a minority, as well as the Commission, argues that the PPEWU should be autonomous
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within the General Secretariat, under the direct line management of the High Representative.
[Europe, 6/7 July 1998, p.4.]
The provision of ‘timely assessments’ and ‘early warning’ is clearly beyond the
Union’s or the WEU’s ability at this moment. The difficulties encountered in the Franco-
German Helios 2 satellite project and the small size of the Torrejon satellite centre suggest
that the Union will not enjoy such a capability for some time to come. The option of relying
upon shared national intelligence assets is one that would most likely prove untenable.
If we set the practical shortcomings of the PPEWU aside, it may yet prove be a two-
edged sword. In order to neutralise as far as possible the influence of the Commission in the
unit, the Member States may decide to send lower level representatives.  However, the
Commission’s enhanced role in CFSP through the unit may encourage higher level
representation with the objective of imposing more intergovernmental supervision on the
Commission. There is the very apparent danger that rather than instilling coherence, the unit
may serve to sharpen the supranational and intergovernmental distinctions within the Union’s
external activities
The PPEWU is but one reform in the CTEU which may one day be of benefit to
consistency. A further and more controversial means of enhancing consistency would have
been to align CFSP decision-making procedures with those of the Community. The 1996
Intergovernmental Conference was divided upon the wisdom of extending qualified majority
voting (QMV). Moves toward QMV would have avoided the likelihood of a major initiative
being hijacked by one Member State or, as tended to happen, in order to ensure unanimity the
resultant agreements measured the lowest common denominator and were often sufficiently
vague as to be virtually meaningless. Article 23 of the CTEU appeared to extend QMV while
also making possible constructive abstention. Closer examination reveals though that QMV
applies to a limited number of circumstances (joint actions, common positions or any other
decision on the basis of a common strategy) and the stipulations include the essence of the
1966 Luxembourg compromise. Under the QMV stipulations, which do not apply to
decisions having defence or military implications, a member of the Council may declare that,
‘for important and stated reasons of national policy, it intends to oppose the adoption of a
decision to be taken by qualified majority, a vote shall not be taken.’ [CTEU, Art. 23 (2)] In
this case the Council may, ‘acting by qualified majority, request that the matter be referred to
the European Council for decision by unanimity.’ The overall effect may not enhance
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consistency since incentives for those opposed to QMV will be to push for as many decisions
as possible to be made on the basis of unanimity. Overall the implementation of the double
QMV and the exclusion of significant areas from qualified voting would appear to have done
little to align Community and CFSP practices.
Consistency is also a matter of appearance or, more specifically, how the EU
represents itself to third parties. Arguably, in the context of consistency, the EU had given a
poor picture of itself. The CTEU introduced the position of High Representative, who is the
Secretary-General of the Council and who shall assist the Presidency. [CTEU, Art. 18 (3)]
Although the new post is a significant dilution of the French designs for a Monsieur PESC,
who would have been directly under the control of the European Council, the potential (and
perhaps unintended) benefits for consistency may arise from the High Representative’s role
as part of a troika consisting of the President of the Council, the Secretary-General of the
Council, and the Vice-President of the Commission responsible for external relations. The
Commission (under Article 18 (4) of the CTEU) is already ‘fully associated’ with the CFSP
and in the Troika context may be able to operate in a largely independent manner. It is
difficult to imagine the High Representative, who is junior to the President of the Council,
assuming an assertive role in the Troika while the Commission representative, allied with the
Commission officials in the PPEWU, may exert a strong influence. The potential therefore
may be for consistency with the Commission playing a more active role in the troika but it
may also provoke profound tensions within the troika between the supranational and
intergovernmental aspects of the Union’s external activities. Furthermore, the High
Representative’s role which, at first glance, would appear to promote consistency may make
little difference given the relatively subservient position accorded to the office. There are still
a number of question marks regarding the High Representative’s role, amongst them being
the political level of the person to be appointed to the post as well as the nature and operation
of the services directly linked to the post (especially the PPEWU).
Lastly, consistency should apply to all areas of the EU’s external activities. Although
defence was not specifically mentioned in the CTEU’s definition of external activities
(Article 3), but security is, some brief comments may be ventured. The caution evident in the
IGC prior to the TEU was reflected in the lead up the Amsterdam Summit and the treaty
itself. The CTEU makes reference to the ‘progressive framing of a common defence policy,’
which ‘might in time lead to a common defence, should the European Council so decide.’
[CTEU, Art. 17 (1)] It is however evident from the general developments since the end of the
Cold War, especially the outlining of the Combined Joint Task Force Concept (CJTF) at the© EIPA
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North Atlantic Council’s Brussels summit in 1994, that security and defence actions have to
be coordinated not only within the second pillar but also between the EU, WEU and NATO.
There are though a number of structural impediments to consistency in the security
and defence realm. Article 23 of the CTEU provides for any Member State to make a
qualified abstention and in this case the Member ‘shall not be obliged to apply the decision,
but shall accept that the decision commits the Union.’ Those Member States who have made
a declaration to this effect ‘shall not be obliged to contribute to the financing [of operations
with military or defence implications].’ [CTEU, Art. 28 (3)]  For participants costs will be
borne on a GNP scale, ‘unless the Council acting unanimously decides otherwise.’[Ibid.] The
problems with this arrangement are all too apparent -- the financial arrangements provide an
incentive for non-participation and, since a GNP scale will be used, it provides an incentive
for the larger Member States not to participate. It is difficult to see how an operation minus,
for example, Britain or Germany, could be portrayed as a credible EU effort.
Consistency should be applied to defence for a number of reasons. First, the dividing
line between security and defence is very difficult to draw and it therefore appears somewhat
arbitrary to include security and exclude defence from external affairs. Second, as Leo
Tindemans recently argued, ‘pressure in favour of a genuine EU common defence policy will
grow as the European Union expands.’ [Europe, 1 May 1998, p.4]  The EP’s Committee on
Foreign Affairs not only endorsed Tindeman’s argument but supported his call for a Council
of Defence Ministers, a White Paper on issues relating to European defence policy, and the
establishment of a permanent police force capable of rapid intervention. Third, an emphasis
upon consistency in the defence realm would encourage the formation of autonomous
capabilities so that the EU and WEU member states are not as dependent upon the U.S. in
circumstances where, as Armand de Decker, Chairman of the WEU Assembly Committee on
Defence argued, ‘the evolution of the world, and of Europe in particular, will increasingly
make the EU and the United States competitors.’ [Europe, 9 May 1998, p.3]
One of the major problems bedevilling the implementation of consistency in the
security area, which would also apply to defence, is the fact that the WEU was not fully
integrated into the EU as a result of the 1997 Amsterdam summit. In fact, relations between
the WEU and NATO are in general stronger than those between the EU and WEU.
Following from this, the issue of security and consistency is complicated by the lack of any
dedicated ‘European’ military assets. All though there are a number of potential assets that
the Union could call upon if need be, such as the Eurocorps or the Combined Joint Task
Forces, the backbone of the operational effectiveness amongst most of the EU militaries© EIPA
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continues to be provided by the United States. In spite of progress that has been made since
1994 in designing and operationalising ‘separable but not separate’ forces, there is still a
profound reluctance to either provide Europe with the resources required for autonomy and a
marked preference to work outside existent and new structures and to rely on ad hoc
solutions. In a meeting of the General Affairs Council the Benelux countries objected to the
increasing use of ad hoc coalitions and pointed out that ‘the existence of ad hoc arrangements
between some Member States in areas of vital importance for the Union – whether third
parties are part of it or not could in time weaken confidence in a strong CFSP.’ [Europe, 29
April 1998, p.3]  Obviously, ad hoccery does not lend itself to consistency either. No amount
of plans for new machinery and mechanisms to promote consistency can overcome the
fundamental problem of the apparent lack of political will to provide a coherent and
autonomous European response when it comes to the security aspects of the Union’s external
activities.
Vertical Consistency
Vertical consistency involves both the process of co-ordination between the member
states and the EU as well as the reverse. As has been observed in the case of horizontal
consistency, there has been a gradual slide from the national ministries to Brussels in terms of
visibility in external relations. In part this has been aided and abetted by changes that have
little to do with the EU per se. For instance, the end of the cold war has witnessed a decline in
concern about traditional security and defence matters and an increase in concern about
global trade. It is then something of an irony that those areas of significance to the EU’s
external relations are those that are most tightly regulated, within the scope of the EC and the
acquis communautaire, while those that of lesser importance are the most jealously guarded
by the member states.
This irony may easily be explained by the changing contexts. External trade policy
was overshadowed by the bipolar international system and security concerns and this explains
in part the fierce defence of the CFSP’s intergovernmental nature. The picture though may
well change again due to a number of factors. First, the general downgrading of security and
defence concerns in the immediate aftermath of the cold war has proven to be a mistake, as© EIPA
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Bosnia and Kosovo have illustrated. Second, the resistance to the ‘communautairisation’ of
the EU’s CFSP has changed, most notably with the Anglo-French St. Malo initiative of
December 1998 which called for an autonomous military capacity for the EU. Third, the
general transferral of influence from the member states to Brussels in the EC context may
well have knock-on effects for other aspects of external relations, including CFSP. These
factors and others suggest that the issue of vertical consistency is more important than ever.
External relations co-ordination between the EU and the Member States
There are a number of tools for ensuring consistency between the EU and the member
states. The Council not only shares responsibility with the Commission for ensuring
consistency in the external relations of the EU but it has the additional burden of ensuring
greater responsibility between the Union and its Member States (vertical consistency). Article
11 of the CTEU states that it is to the Council that responsibility falls for ensuring that
Member States support the Union’s external and security policy actively and unreservedly
and to prevent them from taking action contrary to the interests of the Union. In the EC
context consistency can be enforced through the European Court of Justice while in the
CFSP, which falls outside the jurisdiction of the Court, a number of alternative methods have
been devised, such as common positions and joint action which both commit the Member
States to binding obligations.
 7
According to Article 15 of the CTEU, common positions shall ‘define the approach of
the Union to a particular matter of geographical or thematic nature,’ and ‘Member States
shall ensure that their national policies conform to the common positions.’ Joint actions shall
address ‘specific situations where operational action by the Union is deemed to be required’
and that joint action ‘shall commit Member States in the positions they adopt and in the
conduct of their activity.’ [CTEU, (1997) Article 14.1&3]  The Foreign Ministers Report to
the European Council in Lisbon concentrated on identifying those areas open to joint action.
[Lisbon Report, 1992, Section 1] According to the report joint action ‘must be seen as a
means for the definition and the implementation by the Union of a policy in the framework of
the CFSP in a specific issue.’ Joint actions must furthermore take into account the Union’s
acquis and ‘remain consistent with the other actions and positions’ adopted by the Union. It
was recognised that the ‘existence of important interests in common constitute the basic© EIPA
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criterion for adopting joint action.’ The report also recognised that certain factors will
determine important common interests and three in particular were mentioned:
a)  geographical proximity of a given region or country;
b)  important interests in the political and economic stability of a region or country;
c)  existence of threats to the security interests of the Union.
Joint actions, unlike common positions, are more exact in the sense that they address
‘specific situations where operational action by the Union is deemed to be required’ as well
as the ‘objectives, scope, and means to be made available to the Union.’ [CTEU, 1997, Art.
14]  Any joint action ‘shall commit the Member States in the positions they adopt and in the
conduct of their activity.’ [Ibid.]  A joint action is therefore primarily an agreement between
the Union and the member states, thus reinforcing the idea of vertical consistency. Provision
is also made for those cases of ‘imperative need’ arising from changes in a given situation
and permits Member States to take emergency action in conformity with the general aims of
the joint action.
Joint actions should therefore have been a valuable addition to vertical consistency. In
practice though there has been a general reluctance to use joint actions and a strong
preference for other forms of CFSP action such as declarations. In its commentary upon
progress in implementing the CFSP (in this case from January-December 1996) the EP
observed:
[The EP] deplores the fact that, barring rare exceptions, the use of joint actions and
common positions was confined to isolated matters and the Union did not venture to
employ them to chart long-term comprehensive strategies in relation to key world
issues; further deplores the fact that, three years after the entry into force of the Treaty
on European Union, there are so few joint actions and common positions in
comparison with the number of declarations, although the former are the real
instruments of the CFSP. [OJCD, 1997, A4-0193]
Any cursory examination of the CFSP’s record supports the above claim with
approximately 430 declarations, 90 joint declarations and 50 common positions and joint
actions, being adopted since 1993. Furthermore, it is often difficult to distinguish joint actions
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from common positions.
8 The different status accorded to the types of decision that can
emanate from the CFSP process, by the European Council in Lisbon, or by the TEU or the
later consolidated version, would appear not to be observed in practice.
The CTEU introduced a new type of decision to the second pillar. ‘Common
Strategies’ are to be decided upon by the European Council ‘in areas where the Member
States have important interests in common.’ The establishment of such common interests
implies that there is a good deal of prior consultation between the foreign and other national
ministries as well as in the EU itself. Once this is established, common strategies shall set out
‘their objectives, duration and means to be made available by the Union and the Member
States.’ [CTEU, 1997, Art. 13]. However, under the TEU it was the Council who should
decide on the ‘principle of joint action’ and ‘lay down the specific scope, the Union’s general
and specific objectives in carrying out such actions, if necessary its duration, and the means,
procedures and conditions for its implementation.’ [TEU, 1991, Art.J.3] It would seem
therefore that common strategies have assumed most aspects of ‘joint actions’ under the TEU
with a corresponding emphasis on the role of the European Council rather than the Council.
Common strategies may well prove to enhance coherence amongst the EU Member States by
putting the emphasis on co-ordination as the highest level but, given the relatively infrequent
meetings of the European Council, this may be at the cost of overall consistency of EU
external actions. The tendency to make decisions in a reactive mode will also continue to
raise problems of consistency.
The main underlying problem with enhanced vertical consistency lays in the ongoing
debates about the extent to which the EU’s external activities, and CFSP in particular, should
be primarily intergovernmental or communautaire. Unsurprisingly, those who are more
included towards maintaining an intergovernmental approach are more likely to maintain
looser vertical structures while those who may be more communautaire by inclination are
more likely to approve of mechanisms to tighten vertical consistency. However, in the
absence of any common approach, efforts to enhance vertical consistency will most likely be
frustrated. In a study conducted by the European Commission’s DG-1A on ‘Reforming the
CFSP’ prior to the Amsterdam Summit, the following national positions on were evident on
consistency of foreign policy and visibility:
                                                
8 Joint actions ( Article J.3 of the TEU) commit Member States to act in a certain way. They address the specific
situation where operational action by the EU is required and specifies objectives, scope, and the means available
to the Union and, of necessary, their duration. Common positions  (Article J.2. of the same treaty) defines the
approach of the Union to a particular matter of ‘geographical or thematic nature.’ Member states must ensure
that their national positions conform to the common positions.© EIPA
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Country: Consistency of Foreign Policy and Visibility
Austria -- Examination of instruments of CFSP to increase consistency
-- In favour of legal personality of Union
-- CFSP objectives to be formulated in more concrete manner
-- Gradual communautairsation of foreign policy
Benelux  -- Unity of action
-- Reinforce the role of the Commission
-- Redefine relations between Commission/Council
Denmark -- Cooperation between EU Member States on foreign policy to remain intergovernmental
Finland -- Intensification of co-operation between sub-areas of foreign relations which transcends pillar
borders within framework of existing institutional structure
-- Relations between COREPER and the Political Committee to be explicated
-- Prepared to study giving the Union a legal personality
France -- Preserve the intergovernmental nature of CFSP
-- Clarify the division of tasks between CFSP and the external activities of the Community
-- External action should be more rapid and identifiable on the international scene, as well as
more coherent
-- The High Representative should assure the continuity of the external activities of the Union
Germany --
Greece -- Partial communautairsation of first pillar which would imply more consistency and wider
participation of the institutions (Commission should play a more active role)
-- Objectives should be clearly defined and broadened in three areas: human rights, a guarantee
of the EU’s external borders, and prevention of conflicts
Ireland -- Close cooperation between a Secretariat policy and analysis unit and the Commission to
ensure coherence
Italy -- Establishment of a coordinated structure of analysis, planning and execution in which the
Presidency, the Commission and the Secretary General collaborate, guaranteeing consistency,
efficiency, and visibility
Portugal -- Preservation of the pillar structure: ‘communautairsation’ of CFSP is unrealistic
-- respect for institutional equilibrium (in particular the Commission) and the ‘acquis
communautaire’
-- in favour of legal personality for the Union as a whole
Spain -- suppression of the pillar structure for specific procedures, decisions and execution thereof
(such as EMU)
-- more concrete identification of fundamental interests, in particular diplomatic solidarity on
issues such as guaranteeing the common borders and human rights
-- clarification of common positions and actions of the Union
-- extension of the legal personality of the Union
-- better preparation of the Council’s work: reinforce COREPER’s role
Sweden --
United Kingdom -- will press for more active and effective CFSP while maintaining its intergovernmental
character
-- CFSP can never become an exclusive policy which would replace national foreign policy
wishes to see a Europe which encourages and allows flexibility, recognising the diversity of
Member States rather than the imposition of uniformity
Source: CFSP Forum, 3+4/96, pp.7-16.© EIPA
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External relations co-ordination between the Member States and the EU
Questions of vertical consistency also apply in reverse. How Is consistency ensured
between the member state and the Union? There is however an important distinction since
what is consistent between the Union and the member state is supposed to be the policy of the
Union. However, from the perspective of the member state, it is the Union that is supposed to
accord to its national interest as closely as possible. Thus, the litmus test for consistency from
the member states’ perspective will be the extent to which the Union is consistent with its
national priorities. This version of vertical consistency will not apply to all member states
with equal force. For instance, it may not apply in the case of the smaller states who may not
necessarily have the resources or weight to push their national agenda in Brussels.
Theoretically, as long as it is not too brazen, all member states are afforded the chance
to promote consistency between their perceived national interests and those of the Union with
the rotating EU Presidency. Again, depending on the size of the state holding the presidency,
the position may be used to blatantly advance national positions (such as the German
presidency in the first half of 1999 who used the Presidency as a chance to reallocate EU
finances) or preferred agendas. In practice the ability to push a national agenda is limited by
the short term-in-office of the Presidency (six months) and the Commission’s obligation to
collaborate with the Presidency in ensuring the consistency of the EU’s external relations.
Since Commission delegations represent the EU in all areas of first pillar competence the
possibility for national agenda building is limited. It should also be observed that while the
larger member states obviously do possess the necessary leverage to promote national
positions, the obvious cost of so doing may be the consistency of the EU’s external relations.
The mechanisms for ensuring vertical consistency between the Union and the member
states were further enhanced in the CTEU where the Commission was involved in the Troika
Presidency system at ambassadorial level. In fact the Commission is the only permanent
element within the changing constellations of the EU Presidency of the Council. Any given
member state may be involved for a maximum of eighteen months (that is, for the six months
prior to, during and after their Presidency) in a cycle of seven and a half years. In some areas
the CTEU also afforded the Commission equal status to the diplomatic and consular missions
of the EU member states, especially with reference to representation to third parties. For
instance:© EIPA
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The diplomatic and consular missions of the Member States and the Commission
Delegations in third countries and international conferences, and their representations
to international organisations, shall cooperate in ensuring that common positions and
joint actions adopted by the Council are complied with and implemented. [CTEU,
1997, Article 20]
With increasing frequency the Member States are less able to advance purely national
agendas at the expense of the EU or consistency in its external relations. The Commission’s
influential role in Pillar I and, to an increasing extent Pillar III, mean that the onus is
increasingly on the Member States to co-ordinate their policies and positions with those of
the Community. The superficially clear dividing lines between those aspects of Community
external relations where the responsibility clearly lies with the Commission, primarily on
external economic issues, and those areas where the responsibility lies with the Member
States, especially Pillar II, is in practice blurred. In principle the second pillar, CFSP, remains
intergovernmental but the day-to-day issues often transcend the neat division between
economic and political aspects of the Union’s external relations. To an increasing extent
Foreign Ministries have to accommodate and work with the Commission delegations, largely
due to the logic of monetary union and single trade and agricultural policies, all of which
carry implications for external relations.
It has become increasingly difficult to justify the expense of maintaining embassies
and consulates overseas for many EU Member States when their main role appears to be
export promotion. The logic of fifteen highly integrated economies representing their
collective interests through Commission delegations or even common EU overseas
representations would appear to challenge the need for national representation in many cases.
This does not however obviate the necessity for national representation in areas of special
interest, such as Britain and the Commonwealth or Spain and Latin America. Finally, the
CTEU made it abundantly clear that it is the Union that ‘shall define and implement a
common foreign and security policy covering all areas of foreign and security policy,’ which
stands in contrast to the TEU which made the definition and implementation a shared
responsibility between the ‘Union and its Member States.’ This significant change would
certainly seem to imply that the onus is upon the Member States to ensure the consistency of
their external policies with those of the Union and not vice versa.© EIPA
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Barriers to consistency in the Union’s External Activities
There would seem to be seven identifiable barriers to consistency in general.
Generally the need for enhanced consistency is well recognised within the Union and its
structures. First, it is apparent that consistency depends largely upon the efforts of the
member states to take the initiative to enhance consistency, starting at the national level.
Member States would appear to accept that generally more can be gained from acting in
harmony than alone. The Union’s responsibility to ‘define and implement’ a CFSP covering
‘all areas of foreign and security policy’ points to an obvious loophole – defence policy.
Although this undoubtedly remains the most intransigently intergovernmental aspect of
CFSP, there is room for optimism that the post-St. Malo and Kosovo developments may
actually lead to a common defence policy and common defence. There are though significant
areas of difficulty that need to be acknowledged such as the position of the neutral and non-
aligned Member States, the role of a merged EU-WEU with NATO and the provision of
adequate resources to build the autonomous military capability mentioned in the St. Malo
Declaration.
Second, successive treaties and documents make reference to the ‘common interests’
of the Union but these are inadequately defined and, as a consequence, so too is the persona
of the Union on foreign policy and security terms. The expectation that the common interest
of the member states can be found in the sum total of the diplomatic interests of the member
states is clearly an inadequate basis on which to promote the EU as a foreign policy actor. A
starting point in the identification of common interests is the identification of risks and threats
by a Study and Analysis Unit; an idea first suggested first by the EP. The unit’s task would be
to ‘assess risk and threats from a European perspective and bring national diplomatic corps
and intelligence services into line with the new aspirations of the CFSP.’[OJ C200, 1997,
Para.9]  A further measure to enhance common thinking (by addressing common
disagreements) would be to provide an avenue for policy input aside from the Presidency and
the Council. To achieve this end a mirror to the WEU Institute for Security Studies, or maybe
an extension of it, should be created with a broad CFSP focus. Such an institute could also
play an active role in promoting the ‘European’ content in the training of diplomats and
defence officials in order to foster consistent approaches.
Third, the introduction of qualified majority voting (QMV) procedures into the second
pillar has in fact not helped to foster consistency for two reasons: first, the requirement in
practice remains that of unanimity thus making agreement dependent on compromise and© EIPA
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accommodation at a given moment rather than upon the development of a consistent theme or
stance and; second, QMV procedures might in fact undermine consensus by encouraging
exceptionalism which may be the price of reaching a ‘common position.’ The reforms in the
budgetary procedures, which preserve the division between administrative and operational
expenditure of the TEU, may actually complicate the consistency requirements and create
tensions between Community activities and those taking place under the aegis of the CFSP.
Fourth, the introduction of the PPEWU in the Amsterdam Treaty may prove a useful
means of ensuring consistency. Unfortunately, as of the time of writing, the precise role of
the unit is not subject to agreement amongst the EU members. Nevertheless, the need for a
joint policy analysis mechanism would seem to be a vital part of the identification of
common European interests. Although there are already mechanisms for the exchange of
policy-related information (such as COREU or its successor CORTESY, or joint planning
staff meetings between the Member States and the Union) there is clearly a need to develop
this facet of the Union’s activities. This however will soon bring up the sensitive issue of
intelligence support for Union activities so that it may fulfil its early warning role.
Fifth, alongside the lack of an indigenous intelligence capability, the absence of
prepared priorities in the context of the Union’s external activities necessarily puts the
emphasis on reaction rather than pro-active stances (such as preventive diplomacy or crisis
management). DG-1A mention that one of the aims of the CFSP ‘is to create consistent
policies which are preventive rather than reactive and which assert the EU’s political
identity.’ [DG-1A] The report to the European Council in Lisbon on the likely development
of the CFSP in 1992 also stressed the need for the CFSP to be ‘less reactive to events in the
outside world, and more active in the pursuit of the interests of the Union and in the creation
of a more favourable international environment.’[Lisbon, 1992, Para.3] A pattern though has
already evolved with regard to Albania and Bosnia, and seems to be appearing again with
regard to Kosovo, where the EU adopts a wait and see strategy and then relies upon ad hoc
solutions. The situation may be partially remedied by, as Fraser Cameron has suggested, the
enunciation of clear priority areas to ‘ensure the necessary commitment from all member
states to common action.’ [Cameron, (1997)]
Sixth, the effect of enlargement upon the consistency of the second pillar needs to be
considered. More specifically, will the accession of mainly small countries encourage or
discourage the larger members from co-ordinating their positions through the CFSP. This
may be of special importance regarding QMV practices following accession. It seems only
logical to suggest that the willingness of the larger member states in particular to work© EIPA
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through the CFSP will have to be reflected in voting weight within the Council. This is not an
observation intended to belittle the role or importance of the smaller Member States but
rather a reflection of real politik in the sense that it is ultimately the larger states who will
have to be enticed to use their manpower and resources to underpin most conceivable joint
actions.
Lastly, a major source of inconsistency in the security-related aspects of the Union’s
external activities is to be found in Washington D.C. as well as the European capitals. In an
almost reflex action stemming from the cold war the European allies have come to expect
leadership, especially from the United States. The absence of a common threat in post cold
war Europe has undone much of the willingness on the part of its European allies to find a
common cause, while the U.S. has not been immune from difficulties in putting realistic
goals and priorities behind its self-declared leadership role. Although the embracing of
democratic enlargement lacks the urgency or compelling nature of cold war containment, the
changes in the international system since the beginning of the decade demand that the
European powers themselves enunciate clear goals and priorities. Only by so doing can the
Union develop consistent and attainable strategies and goals and only then will it be seen as a
significant actor beyond the confines of the member states themselves.© EIPA
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APPENDIX I
Source: Uwe Schmalz, ‘The Concept of Coherence in the Amsterdam Treaty- Bridging the Union’s Dual External Foreign Policy Structure?, CFSP Forum, 1/98, p.5.
Institutional/procedural EC external affairs Maastricht provisions Amsterdam provisions
Characteristics on CFSP on CFSP
Competencies -- commercial policy -- foreign policy -- foreign policy
-- development co-op -- security policy -- security policy
-- association -- prospective common defence -- prospective common defence
Decision making -- (partial) supranat. -- intergovernmental, -- intergovernmental,
majority voting unanimity rule, unanimity rule,
possible exceptions: possible exceptions:
  a) QMV for implementation of a) decisions on the basis of a
joint actions (to be decided common strategy
on unanimously) b) implementation of joint
b) abstention in case of a actions or common positions
qualified majority exists for the reservations
respective decision  -- right for veto in case of vital
national interests
-- not applying to decisions
having military/defence
implications
Role of the -- monopoly for initiatives -- fully associated with CFSP -- fully associated with CFSP
European Commission -- independent mediator, -- right of initiative -- right of initiative
guardian, representative and -- member of Troika
and promoter of Community -- member of PPEWU
interests
Role of the European -- limited but substantial rights for -- consultation and information -- consultation and information
Parliament co-decision and assent (i.e. through Council Presidency  through Council and Presidency
Association Agreements, budget, and Commission and Commission
Enlargement)   -- right for questions and  -- right for questions and
recommendations recommendations
-- annual debate on progress in -- annual debate in progress in
implementing CFSP in implementing CFSP
-- de facto last say in financing -- last say in laying down the
joint actions annual CFSP budget
-- increased information and
consultation on all aspects of
CFSP-financing through Council
-- information about every CFSP
decision liable to costs through the
Council
-- annual written  reports of  the
Council on main developments
and options of CFSP
Preparation on  -- EC Working Groups -- CFSP Working groups -- CFSP Working groups
Council’s working level ( de facto largely separated) (de facto largely separated) (de facto largely separated)
-- COREPER -- CFSP Counsellors -- CFSP Counsellors
-- Political Committee -- Political Committee
-- COREPER -- COREPER
Legal supervision -- European Court of Justice -- none -- none© EIPA
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